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n this paper I propose to do the following: I will discuss the notions of 
intentionality and self-understanding of Dasein as developed in 
Heidegger’s Basic Problems of Phenomenology.  In doing so, I will try to show 
the interrelation of Dasein’s always being intentionally directed towards 
something and its self-interpretation.  As we will see, the everyday world has, 
for Heidegger, a character of “equipmental contexture.” This means that 
Dasein returns to itself from out of things, equipment, tools, or—quite 
differently—the work of art.  In a word, Dasein is mirrored back toward itself 
from the things made, from the products of techne.1 From this will follow the 
important distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.  There is a sense 
in which the following pairings could be discerned: tools or pieces of 
equipment link up with inauthenticity, while the work of art links up with 
authenticity.  I will say more on the subject of tools a bit later in the essay.  
Both kinds of things are things insofar as they are entrenched in techne.  The 
common root seems almost inexplicable in the light of the vast difference 
between tools and the artwork.  Moreover, both Dasein and techne seem to have 
another equally enigmatic common root: that of temporality.  Temporality is 
the essential bond between Dasein and the double sense of techne, which 
suggests the double-sidedness of temporality itself.  It is precisely this double-
sidedness that I would like to have as the backdrop to my discussion as a 
whole.  Finally, I will turn to a few pages of Heidegger’s Being and Time and 
Bernard Stiegler’s book Technics and Time I in order to complicate this notion of 
the two senses of temporality, the owned and disowned, originary and 
everyday, and its relation to work and techne.  The overarching question here 
will be: Can the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity be 
sustained? 
  By way of stage-setting, it is important to say a few words about the 
overarching theme of Section Fifteen of the Basic Problems, entitled “The 
fundamental problem of the multiplicity of ways of being and of the unity of 
                                                 
1 However, we should not forget that Dasein can also come back to itself from other 
Dasein.  As Heidegger puts it, “Not only is Being towards Others an autonomous, irreducible 
relationship of Being: this relationship, as Being-with, is one which, with Dasein’s Being, already 
is.” On another occasion, Heidegger describes being-with as “thraldom,” which suggests a 
certain captivity and the subsequent release from it.  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (San 
Francisco:  Harper San Francisco, 1962), 125-163. 
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the concept of being in general.”2 Heidegger points out the somewhat 
contradictory character of modern ontology by asking: If the being of the 
thinking subject (res cogitans) is radically different from the being of other things 
(res extensa), then is it possible to say that there is such a thing as being in 
general? Heidegger’s concern here can be understood as follows: on the one 
hand, he is being critical of modern ontology insofar as it understands the 
being of both res cogitans and res extensa as present-at-hand, which means that 
both have fundamentally the same way of being; on the other hand, he asks 
how it is possible to draw such a rigid distinction between the thinking subject 
and other beings and yet endorse a unitary concept of being.  If the subject is 
indeed so different from other entities, then it must have a different mode of 
being.  Thus, the radicalization of this very distinction between the different 
modes of being is called for. 
  In order to widen this gap between the being of the subject and the 
being of other beings, one needs to work out a more radical conception of the 
subject, which is to say that one needs to ask what Dasein or human existence3 
means.  This is in fact what Heidegger proceeds to do in Section A by giving us 
the “initial preview of the existential constitution of the Dasein.”4 In giving this 
preview, Heidegger exhibits “the being of that being to whose being (existence) 
an understanding of being belongs and to the interpretation of which all the problems of 
ontology generally return.”5 The question following out from this statement is: how 
does Dasein understand itself? Heidegger then asserts that Dasein is ontically6 
nearest to itself because it is  itself in each instance and yet ontologically 
furthest.7 What this important statement refers to is the difficulty of Dasein’s 
access to itself.  Although we certainly do not mistake ourselves for somebody 
else in our everyday commerce with the world, the “da” of Dasein remains 
most hidden.  Heidegger then says that “the Dasein’s comportments have an 
intentional character” and that “on the basis of this intentionality the subject 
already stands in relation to things that it itself is not.”8 One could say then that 
Dasein’s intentionality is relational dialectic with its world. 
  Yet this should not lead us to believe that Dasein is simply a subject 
because it is always characterized by intentionality, which means that perceiving 
is always the perception of something, thinking is always thinking of something.  
That is, every act of Dasein is always a relating to something and in this sense 
there is no interiority in Dasein that underlies all relations.  Relating belongs to 
                                                 
2 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington:  Indiana University 
Press, 1988). 
3 The German “da” (there) and “sein” (being) literally mean “being-there.” 
4 Ibid., 154. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The terms “ontic” and “ontological” describe two ways of discussing Dasein’s being: 
the one in terms of the formal ontological structures and the other in terms of the concrete, 
factical way of being at any given moment.  The ontic way of being is always articulated by the 
formal ontological structures.    
7 Ibid., 155. 
8 Ibid. 
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the very ontological constitution of the subjective self.9 Dasein always exists in 
the presence of other beings and cannot therefore be isolated from them. 
  Heidegger further articulates precisely this point by saying that the 
everyday determination of Dasein as an ego is in and through this relational 
comportment or intentionality.10 This is not to be conflated with the idea that 
relational acts simply radiate from the self, that it is the given self who initiates 
these acts.  The given ego is not the bearer of its own intentional acts because 
there is no given ego as such.  It seems that Dasein does not underlie all its 
relational acts but rather happens  in and through them.  Human existence 
“stands out” (the literal sense of the verb “to exist”) by way of intentional acts 
and for that reason can never be separated from them. 
  Phenomenologically speaking, our dealings in the world and our 
understanding of ourselves as being-in-the-world are not marked by any sense 
of the ego.  The question is then: How do we come to know and even 
experience ourselves as the ego? The multiple references to philosophical 
tradition in the chapter under consideration seem to suggest that the long-
established equation of Dasein with the isolated ego is perpetuated by the 
philosophical tradition itself.11 According to Heidegger, the insertion of the ego 
is subsequent to the event of thought.  The next question Heidegger goes on to 
ask is: How do we experience ourselves, in what way are we given to ourselves 
phenomenologically? The task for Heidegger is to find an adequate 
interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of Dasein, i.e., of Dasein in 
the facticity of its being.  This means first and foremost taking into account the 
dictum of phenomenology, “to return to the things themselves,” by freeing 
ourselves to the extent that we can from our conceptual presuppositions. 
  But what might a phenomenologically accurate account of our self-
experience be? With a view to this concern, Heidegger reaffirms that our 
understanding of ourselves does not arise out of a conscious discovery or 
thinking.  As he puts it, “The self is there for the Dasein itself without 
reflection and without inner perception, before all reflection.”12 Dasein primarily 
finds itself in the things themselves it is concerned with.13 The self is neither a 
hidden interiority nor is it something existing in the background of all 
intentional acts.  Dasein understands itself from out of things in the world, it is 
always in the midst of and assailed (bedrängt) by them, which leads to what 
Heidegger terms the “associated unveiling of the self.”14  “In everyday terms,” 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 157. 
10 Ibid., 158. 
11 The context of this claim is Heidegger’s extensive demonstration of his thesis that the 
Greeks hastily equated being with ousia, substance.  Interpreted or in effect misinterpreted in this 
way, being was inserted into the philosophical tradition as being present-at-hand, constant, 
outside of time.  For details, see, for example, Section Eleven of Chapter Two in the Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. 
12 Ibid., 159. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 158. 
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Heidegger continues, “we understand ourselves and our existence by way of 
the activities we pursue and the things we take care of.”15  
  Das ein’s  coming ba ck to i ts el f from out of thi ngs  brings  us  to the 
important notions of authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity.  Everyday 
self-understanding is not authentic insofar as it does not arise from out of “the 
most proper and most extreme possibilities of our own existence.”16 For 
Heidegger, everydayness (Altäglichkeit) names a distinct way of existing—the 
one that is characterized first and foremost by pervasiveness and indifference.17 
Although it is the most common way of Dasein’s being, the everyday Dasein 
becomes indistinguishable from its daily concerns.  The self of such 
understanding dissolves into things.  This inauthentic self-understanding, 
however, is neither ungenuine nor illusory.18 It is important to realize that 
inauthenticity and authenticity are modes of Dasein’s self-understanding.  The 
former is Dasein’s interpreting itself from out of the being of those beings that 
are radically distinct from it or in terms of its absorbed involvement with those 
beings.  It is also possible to say that Dasein perceives itself as ‘anyone,’ as the 
anonymous ‘they.’ The latter is interpreting itself in terms of its most proper 
being or its most proper possibilities of being.  The latter (which will later be 
referred to as the being-towards-death) is what Heidegger understands by 
freedom.  Inauthenticity is then about absorption (Aufgehen) or, according to 
the literal meaning of the German term, going up into things.19 It is essentially 
characterized by lostness of the self.  That is, our interpretative appropriation 
of ourselves is inauthentic or simply misguided; it is not ourselves in our most 
proper being that we appropriate as what we are.  This does not mean that we 
do not have the authentic experience of ourselves in this self-absorption in 
things.  It is rather the question of the disjunction between our experience of 
ourselves and our conceptual expression of it.  It is this lack of a 
phenomenologically suitable interpretation of ourselves that Heidegger draws 
our attention to.20 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 159. 
16 Ibid., 160. 
17 “Everydayness” is the how “in accordance with which Dasein ‘lives unto the day [“in 
den Tag hineinlebt”], whether in all its ways of behaving or only in certain ones which have been 
prescribed by Being-with-one-another.” Heidegger goes on to say that “in everydayness 
everything is all one and the same, but whatever the day may bring is taken as diversification.” 
Being and Time, 370-1. 
18 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 160. 
19 This is analogous to the notion of ‘fallenness’ (Verfallenheit) in Being and Time.  Indeed, 
fallenness into the world means “an absorption in Being-with-one-another, in so far as the latter 
is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.” Being and Time, 175. 
20 One question that arises here is whether a phenomenological description of reality is 
more useful than its normative description.  That is, there is no way to tell that someone is acting 
authentically or inauthentically.  The difference between the two modes exists only for the one 
who is acting.  Perhaps the indescirnibility of the two ‘on the outside’ has a greater philosophical 
significance than their invisible, private distinction.  One should bear in mind, however, that 
Heidegger is concerned with the most general question of ontology—that of being.  An inquiry 
into the way people appear in the social space would be a specification and therefore a deviation 

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  Heidegger’s guiding concern here seems to be the horizon of our 
projection.  Our understanding is, we recall, projecting ourselves upon a 
particular possibility of being.  In the case of authentic and inauthentic 
existence there are two radically different horizons of projection: one is the 
projection upon this or that possibility as specified by one’s role in life, by ontic 
determinations; and the other is the projection upon our existence as such, i.e., 
our finitude.  For instance, when chooses a certain profession, it is possible to 
fully identify with the chosen role and do everything for its sake, that is, to 
succeed in one’s career as if it were an end in itself.  What we have in this case 
is the projection onto one ontic determination—one’s career.  This kind of 
projection also signifies a closure, a certain blindness to other possibilities.  If, 
however, one realizes that the concern for his or her professional success 
ultimately points toward the concern for one’s being as such, no full 
identification with this or that ontic particular will be possible.  This is to say 
that the person in question will see him- or herself as different from the chosen 
object, as someone who can never be relieved of the task to choose the 
possibilities of one’s being.  In this case, the sense of difference or the space 
between the one who chooses and the object being chosen ensures an 
openness to the future, i.e., the possibility of choosing something genuinely 
anew.   
  Heidegger adds another clarification to “this mysterious reflection of 
the self from things” by saying that Dasein is not “in” the things as something 
extant among them but is rather “with” the things.21 An “antecedent 
transposition” is the condition of our being able to return to ourselves.22 The 
task is to inquire into the meaning of this transposition and its relationship to 
the ontological constitution of Dasein.  The question of transposition translates 
into that of transcendence.23 Heidegger defines transcendence as a “fundamental 
determination of the ontological structure of the Dasein.”24 The subject of transcendence 
goes hand in hand with a problem that he claims is “unknown to all previous 
philosophy,” the problem of world.  His critique of Fichte serves as a 
passageway to his discussion of this problem: The Fichtean dictum “Think the 
wall, and then think the one who thinks the wall” in effect invites us to become 
blind to the world.25 This is the case because the world is prior to any explicit 
cognitive understanding of the object.26  What is given to us is never the object 
                                                                                                                 
from the original inquiry.  The merit of Heidegger’s description is that it conceptually captures 
the sense of being, i.e., the way in which being affects our self-understanding.   
21 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 161. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 162. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.   
26 Although I cannot discuss this in any detail due to the constraints of space and time, it 
should be emphasized that for Heidegger the distinction between how the world is for us and 
how it is in itself is not a tenable one.  Given his commitment to the investigation of facticity, 
givenness, or the ways in which one finds him- or herself in the world, it seems that there is no 
passageway to any kind of supersensible realm.  Otherwise put, any such realm would have to be 
given for Dasein in one way or another in order to fall under the scope of Heidegger’s inquiry.  

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in isolation.  Rather, what is primarily given is a contexture, a contextual whole 
of equipmentality.27 “The nearest things that surround us,” Heidegger tells us, 
“we call equipment.”28 We see this whole from out of a practical 
circumspection,  Umsicht.29 What is characteristic of circumspective seeing is 
that it always sees things from out of our specific involvement in the world.  
The world that we encounter in this involved seeing is, literally, the world that 
surrounds us, Umwelt.  This contexture is not something we can bring about or 
arrive at insofar as to see something as one determinate thing is to see it 
necessarily in relation to other things, to the whole that has already been given 
to us.  Each piece of equipment refers to “that for which it is what it is.”30 It is 
thus always anchored in a specific for-which  or  in-order-to.31 Nonetheless, the 
seemingly endless chain of ends and means ultimately points back to Dasein’s 
own being.  It is Dasein’s own being that is first of all at stake here and that for 
the sake of which the referential or relational chain is activated in the first 
place.  But yet it is precisely the “for the sake of Dasein’s being” that tends to 
be forgotten in Dasein’s dealings with the world.   
  Heidegger’s emphasis on equipmentality may at first seem puzzling 
and therefore it merits a closer look.  It seems that Heidegger wants to 
accentuate the equipmental character of things in order to disown the equation 
of things with mere objects, something that stands before us and leaves us 
indifferent.  Things serve as the means to achieve our practical goals.  Yet, we 
should not hastily conclude that the fairly simple contrast between non-useful 
and useful things is at stake here.  The key here is that any piece of equipment 
is always already woven into the world and, in being used, tacitly illuminates the 
surrounding world to the extent it is able.   
  Heidegger’s phenomenological interrogation of the problem of world 
is radical because it differs from prior philosophical inquiry.  At least in 
modernity, philosophical inquiry into the problem of world always started from 
the relation between the subject and a particular isolated object.  Such a 
formulation of the question is already a fabrication of our original experience 
of things in the world.  Philosophy has always illegitimately redirected the 
problem of world to the problem of nature.32 In other words, philosophy has 
always seen what was in a sense furthest from it, thus failing to recognize the 
concept of world as such.  For Heidegger, world is neither nature nor 
presence-at-hand nor a totality of present-at-hand things.33 The totality of 
                                                                                                                 
Yet, any givenness for human experience would compromise the objective ‘purity’ of such a 
realm.  What this means is that we can no longer speak of the limitation of our human faculty of 
understanding, for this would mean that there is a different, experientially inaccessible world that 
we can only speculate about.  Part of Heidegger’s innovation here is that he minimized the gap 
between the concept and life.   
27 Ibid., 163. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.   
31 Ibid., 164. 
32 Ibid., 165. 
33 Ibid. 

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things is, as he writes about it, the intraworldly, that which lies within  the 
world.34 This distinction is in place because for something to be an entity 
means that it appears within the world.  Yet this does not mean that the world is 
the sum of what is within it.  Heidegger’s basic determination of world is that 
the “world is not something subsequent that we calculate as a result from the 
sum of all beings.”35 It is rather the antecedent horizon that is always ahead of 
us and out of which we return when we grasp this or that object.  As 
Heidegger writes, “We are able to come up against intraworldly beings solely 
because, as existing beings, we are always already in a world.”36 The world, he 
goes on to say, has the Dasein-like mode of being.37 If the world is Dasein-ish, 
i.e., subjective, it is precisely the phenomenon of world that calls for the 
radicalization of subjectivity.38 
  What is it that inextricably binds Dasein and the world? It is what 
Heidegger calls “projection” (Entwurf).  Existence is, in addition to other 
things, casting-forth a world.39 Since Dasein’s essential characteristic was said 
to be an understanding of being (which is in each case mine, as we are about to 
see) and since Dasein and the world are essentially the same, it follows that 
Dasein has an understanding of the world, the understanding of the world that 
is prior to a more nuanced understanding of this or that phenomenon in the 
world.40 What I would like to note here is a peculiar interlacing of an 
understanding of being and an understanding of the world, that is, Dasein’s 
self-understanding and its understanding of the whole of relations.  Heidegger 
then writes that since “world-understanding is at the same time an understanding-
of-itself by the Dasein,” the understanding of the being that pertains to 
intentionality embraces two radically different ways of being, the being of 
Dasein and that of extant or intraworldly entities.41 Such general understanding 
of being, Heidegger says a few lines down, is indifferent, blind to “specific 
ways of being.” Thus, we see that intentionality in conjunction with 
Heidegger’s “Dasein-ish” concept of the world opens the way and accounts for 
Dasein’s essential tendency to become lost in entities that are fundamentally 
different from it.   
  In the next section, Heidegger points out two essential determinations 
of Dasein.  The first is that Dasein exists for the sake of its own self or that “it 
is occupied with its own capacity to be.”42 The second is that Dasein is in each 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid.   
37 Ibid., 166. 
38 Ibid., 168. 
39 Ibid. 
40 I would like to point out the essential interrelation of Dasein’s understanding of its 
being in the world and attunement (Stimmung).  This interrelation tells us that Dasein’s 
understanding is not neutral, unspecific, or colorless.  Attunement means being attuned to the 
world in this or that way, being disposed to one’s being in the world one way or another.  It is, 
one could say, an affective coloring that is indissoluble from Dasein’s understanding. 
41 Ibid., 175. 
42 Ibid., 170. 
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case mine (jemeinig).  This “in each case mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) constitutes the 
singularity of Dasein insofar as it means that Dasein belongs to itself in its very 
mode of being as acting.  In the “in each case” Dasein becomes plainly 
unmistakable to itself.  Dasein’s concern with its own being means that it has 
the task of being in this situation here and now.  This task cannot be handed 
over to anyone else.  Dasein can lose or forget itself only and precisely because 
it is its own.43 This lostness in things is in fact the first way in which Dasein is 
unveiled to itself insofar as “inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of 
factical Dasein.”44 Heidegger states that “authenticity is only a modification but 
not a total obliteration of inauthenticity.”45 At this point it is possible to bring 
the problematic into sharper relief.  On the one hand, we have the essential 
unavoidability of the “I,” Dasein’s ineluctable glimpse into its “mineness” and 
the responsibility associated with it.  On the other hand, we are told that 
Dasein is inauthentic by its very nature.  Indeed, we are enigmatically told that 
authenticity is only a modification of Dasein’s purposeful comportment of the 
everyday.  The three questions that arise here are as follows.  Firstly, if Dasein’s 
reflexivity is about its coming back to itself from out of things, what kind of 
difference must be inscribed in the very being of things to allow for Dasein’s 
more authentic return to itself? If directedness to things is prior to Dasein’s 
authentic self-understanding, what is it that addresses Dasein from out of 
things and, as it were, makes it face ontologically its ownmost being? In the 
crudest sense, it concerns that which sparks off change in self-understanding in 
the first place.  The second question is this: What is it about Dasein’s being 
that makes possible the authentic return to itself? It is thus about the “how” of 
change.  The third question is: If the self is primarily exteriority, there seems to 
be no other place for Dasein to return to other than the situation it is already 
in.  Yet the focus of understanding nevertheless shifts.  In what sense?46 It is 
about the content of change. 
  Given the designation of things as “intraworldly,” it appears that 
Dasein shifts from “the world” in its richness to concrete things with a 
remarkable lightness.  For Dasein, the world tends to contract into things and 
grow out of them again.  Heidegger substantiates such an interpretation with a 
reference to childhood where he says that the child’s world is charged with 
world.47 This translates into the notion that the experience of world is prior to 
any experience of selfhood.  The mention of childhood is followed by an 
appeal to Rilke’s poem.  Poetry or creative literature (Dichtung) is understood 
here as the manifestation of our being-in-the-world or something like an 
authentic (hermeneutically open) response to the world that addresses us from 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 171. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Although I will not address this question explicitly, I hope we will be able to see that 
the content of change is essentially about the way in which Dasein takes up its facticity or 
thrownness.  Differently put, as was said before with regard to authenticity, it is about Dasein’s 
self-interpretation. 
47 Ibid.   
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out of things.  This reference to poetry seems the presage of Heidegger’s work 
in the 1930s marked by the explicit concern with the poetic word.  One of the 
possible questions is: Where does poetizing end and philosophy begin if both 
are about letting the world speak to us? Another question we ask is: Do we 
need to be temporally distant from things (ruins or Rilkean walls) in order to 
see them in their unfamiliarity, in order to be captivated by their estranging 
power? If we do and if the recognition of our having-been in the world is 
uncanny, then is it because of our always coming too late, that is, our inability 
to be where we have been and even where we are now—in short, because of 
our mortality? Is it techne that discloses to us the fact that we as humans are 
necessarily unable to be at home in any moment or at any site? 
  Now I would to complicate matters further by shifting my discussion 
to Stiegler’s Time and Technics.  Stiegler writes, “Concern is always inscribed in a 
complex of tools, and a tool is always inscribed in a finality that itself stems 
from a mode of temporalization of temporality.”48 To bring this closer to the 
language of my paper, concern or care is what guides Dasein through the lattice 
of references or relations.  Even in Dasein’s self-forgetting, care is the singular 
Dasein in its existing, in its multiple ways of passing through the whole of 
relations.  A piece of equipment is lodged in the “for-the-sake-of” and hence in 
a kind of finality.  This finality originates in a mode of temporalization of 
temporality, which is, Stiegler goes on to add, a forgetting.49 At this point we 
may wonder whether the injection of the language of temporality into Dasein’s 
transactions within the referential framework adds anything new to the already 
introduced notions of projection and horizons.  What seems to be at stake here 
is the way in which Dasein endures through the everydayness and the way in 
which the everydayness is essentially repeatable or selfsame.  Being absorbed in 
and permeated by its everyday concerns, Dasein acquires a certain duration, a 
sense of time that is selfsame, undifferentiated.  The neutral, everyone’s 
temporality is, as it were, communicated to Dasein by the entities it deals with.  
Another way of saying this would be that Dasein’s disowned temporality and 
hence the seeming constancy of its being as such are “held together” by the 
things it is concerned with, not the other way around.  It is this temporality that 
is synonymous with Dasein’s forgetting of its radical singularity, its 
“mineness.”50 
                                                 
48 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford:  Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 264. 
49 Ibid. 
50 For the Heidegger of Contributions to Philosophy, this will translate into the notion of 
Ereignis, i.e., the event of appropriation or enowning.  Dasein becomes a self insofar as the self is 
given to it historically in the moment of enowning.  In enowning, being determines Dasein’s 
historical projection, which is to say, Dasein’s self-understanding in terms of its own historical 
situation.  More precisely, enowning indicates belonging-together of Dasein and being.  It also 
brings Dasein “before the passing of the last god.” Here we can say that the last god, just like 
finitude in Being and Time, is an indication of the experience that being is given to Dasein.  It is 
the experience that Dasein can never be the master of its own being that, as it were, discloses 
being itself.  See Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), 286-7. 


K.  LEBEDEVA     91 
  Stiegler then asks, “But is not this forgetting of the Self salutary, 
referring to a more originary temporality?” I will attempt to delineate the sense 
in which this forgetting can be said to be salutary at all, the way Stiegler sees it. 
  But first a few words need to be said about the temporality of 
authenticity, the way Heidegger writes about it in Being and Time.  It was pointed 
out earlier that there are two senses of horizon at work in Dasein’s projection 
or understanding: in the first case, Dasein projects itself upon particular ontic 
possibilities that are given to it and in the other case it understands itself from 
out of the possibility of its ownmost being, which is to say, its finitude.  In 
what way can we align Dasein’s own being as possibility with finitude at all? 
  We could approach the complex and ample discussion of Dasein’s 
being-towards-death laid out in Being and Time by first drawing two 
observations on what has been discussed so far in the course of present essay.  
First, the language of projection, antecedent horizon, and transcendence calls 
attention to Dasein’s existence as equivalent to possibility.  In its being directed 
toward the future and coming back to itself from out of the future, the 
ontological realm of Dasein is the realm of the possible.  Yet, this realm of the 
possible is not infinite, for in this case Dasein would never return to itself.  In 
other words, Dasein would glide over its possibilities without ever having to 
choose one or the other and without looking back to itself.  Given the Dasein-
like character of the world and the world as the site of disclosure of all 
possibilities, we can conclude that the complex of Dasein’s possibilities is as 
finite as Dasein itself.  What necessarily circumscribes the realm of Dasein’s 
possibilities is nothing other than its own death.  Second, we saw that Dasein 
relates to its ontic possibilities by things qua tools, which means that at the 
level of the everydayness, Dasein sees its possibilities as essentially realizable or 
achievable.  The definitional purity of Dasein’s ontic possibilities is 
compromised by their realizable character, their tendency to dissolve into 
actuality.  If there is one possibility that can never be actualized, it is death.  For 
the Heidegger of Being and Time, being-towards-death is the quintessential 
relation to the possible.  Dasein is there as long as its death is as a possibility.  
He writes, “The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a 
possibility, is far as possible from anything actual.”51 In this way, death assumes the 
character of the most extreme possibility, possibility in the fullest sense of the 
word.  Heidegger then elaborates the notion of the unrealizable possibility by 
saying that the possibility in question is “the possibility of the impossibility of any 
human existence at all.”52 This is another way of saying that for Dasein, its death 
can only be precisely as possible.  The possibility of death, Heidegger goes on 
to say, “reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all” and “offers no 
support for becoming intent on something, ‘picturing’ to oneself the actuality 
which is possible.”53 Before the possibility of death, all other possibilities that 
are present for Dasein become unfamiliar and meaningless and for this reason 
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require something like a revaluation.  Since this possibility also turns out to be 
“one’s  ownmost  and uttermost potentiality-for-Being,” it is now seen as the 
source of any meaningful recasting of Dasein’s circumstantial givenness.54 It is 
the openness that is first disclosed in Dasein’s shattering against its finitude 
that allows Dasein to be free, i.e., to be different from how it was before and 
therefore to take on its facticity in a creative, recontextualized way. 
  The question that emerges from this is: How does Dasein’s relation to 
its most extreme possibility affect its self-understanding? To put it in another 
way, what happens to Dasein’s self-understanding after it comes up against the 
limit of all of its ontic possibilities? Heidegger’s discussion of guilt and the call 
of conscience offers us some help in answering this question.  He strips the 
notion of guilt of its moral connotations and defines it instead as “Being-the-basis 
of a nullity.”55 What does it mean to say that Dasein’s being is grounded in the 
nothing, a nullity or a lack? The ground of an entity is identical with the entity’s 
reason or cause.  The groundlessness of Dasein has everything to do with the 
fact that it is not self-caused.  In other words, Dasein has not been thrown into 
its “there” of its own accord.56 Since Dasein’s facticity or thrownness is 
saturated with negativity, two things follow.  First, its own being was, as it 
were, handed over to it.  The event of Dasein’s origination always precedes it 
and is therefore beyond its grasp.  Thus, Dasein is guilty first of all to itself 
insofar as it constantly falls behind its own being.  Second, as Heidegger tells 
us, Dasein is  this thrown ground “only in that it projects itself upon 
possibilities into which it has been thrown.”57 Dasein’s coincidence with its 
facticity, its rootedness in a particular set of circumstances and an array of 
particular possibilities that stems from it, is also in reference to the possibility 
of no-longer-existing, to the negativity of Dasein’s mortal horizon which 
shatteringly echoes the negativity bound up with its origination.  Being out for 
the possibility of death discloses that into which Dasein has already been 
thrown.  Hence, Dasein’s authentic relation to the future recoils upon its 
r e l a t i o n  t o  i t s  p a s t  i n s o f a r  a s  i n  a n t i c i p a t i n g  d e a t h ,  D a s e i n  i s  f r e e  t o  
appropriate—that is, to repeat or retrieve—what is already given to it.  In a 
sense, Dasein authentically chooses what is already its own.   It comes to be 
ontologically itself by virtue of the individuating force of finitude.58 That is, it is 
with a view to its finitude that Dasein’s is ‘introduced’ to the true nature of its 
cares or concerns in its world in that it realizes that its cares center around its 
own being. 
  Yet, as we saw throughout this paper, Dasein is for the most part 
absorbed into its everyday world of plans and concerns.  It therefore seems 
that there must be something that pulls Dasein away from its daily affairs and 
summons it to its groundlessness.  It seems, however, that this “something” 
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cannot come entirely from the outside, since it is Dasein’s ownmost being that 
is at stake here.  Or at least, the summons cannot be issued forth by the outside 
as everydayness, since it is precisely in it that the being of Dasein is conflated 
with the being of other entities unlike it.  Keeping up with the language of 
guilt, Heidegger terms this phenomenon “the call of conscience.” What is this 
call like and whose call is it?  
  Heidegger asserts that “conscience discourses solely and constantly in 
the mode of keeping silent.”59 Silence is speaking insofar as it gives something 
to understand, but yet silence is opposed to all ontic discourse.  When Dasein 
falls under the spell of silence, it is transported into the midst of the uncanny, 
not-being-at-home, or, to put it another way, the unbridgeable difference 
between itself and everything around it, the difference between the ontological 
and the ontic.  The call of conscience summons Dasein to its ownmost 
potentiality for being, which means that Dasein’s being becomes an issue for it 
in the highest degree.  The call differentiates Dasein from whatever it is 
ordinarily involved with and it makes room for Dasein’s looking at its life-
context anew by precisely highlighting the fact that Dasein as potentiality could 
have been or could yet be otherwise than it is.  What this amounts to is that the 
call animates the possibility of a genuine change or transformation of Dasein.   
The call and the caller, Heidegger goes on to say, are paradoxically one.  He 
writes, “The call comes from me, and yet from beyond me and over me.”60 Dasein 
then splits into a command to authentically choose itself and the 
accomplishment of that command.  Dasein simultaneously reminds itself and is 
reminded that it inevitably has the task to be, that in not coming into existence 
of its own accord, Dasein is not quite coincident with its being and is always 
yet to catch up with it by assuming its having-been. 
  What the preceding paragraphs attempted to bring to light is the 
following: Dasein can appropriate its own being as that which is shot through 
with negativity and because of that.  Dasein has to pass through its own nullity 
in order to make an authentic choice about its being.  In other words, Dasein 
has to allow negativity to work a change upon its self-understanding by 
severing it from the ontic, everyday context.  Such a passage through the 
nothing is possible only when Dasein is called upon or addressed by 
something.  Yet the identification of Dasein with both the call and the caller 
makes the situation all the more enigmatic, since we have already seen Dasein’s 
inseparability from the world or, in other words, the blurring of interiority and 
exteriority.  The question is then: What is the role of Dasein’s everyday world 
when it comes to the disquieting call of conscience or the call of the nothing? 
  Now we are prepared to return to and assess Stiegler’s claim about 
self-forgetting in relation to temporality and the aforesaid question.  Stiegler 
purports to introduce the question of work into the equation of the outside 
with instrumentality, techne.  He refers to Maurice Blanchot’s example of a 
writer to illustrate his point.  A writer is a contradiction because someone who 
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wants to write must know that he or she possess the gift to write, yet one does 
not know whether the gift is in fact there, until something is written by that 
person.  The writer is in this sense posterior to his or her work and is therefore 
defined by it.   
  Stiegler transfers the situation of the writer to that of humanity in 
general by saying that the “question of writing is nothing but a radicalization of 
that of the memory of the human.”61 Human beings recognize or, more 
precisely, remember themselves as having-been in the traces of writing.  It is 
however the task of the human being to first produce these traces and in order 
to do that it must forget itself.  To forget the self means to “let one’s other 
be—but another who is not a self, not one’s own, but quite other.”62 
Disappropriation, letting go of that which is one’s own is the prerequisite for 
work as such.  Yet, the loss of the self that is quintessential for work is 
countered by the recognition of ourselves in the work produced, the 
recognition of ourselves precisely as new to or not ourselves.  According to the 
example of the writer, the effects produced invest the person who is writing 
with a crucially new self-understanding. 
An important point follows.  If the self is somehow renewed in the process of 
work, there can never be attained the presence of the self.  To put this in more 
Heideggerian language, we could say that Dasein returns to itself precisely in 
the moment of differentiation from itself.  For Stiegler, the essential 
intertwining and inseparability of the human being and the world is best 
instantiated in the phenomenon of work.  In a certain sense, the notion of 
work brings to the fore the malleability of Dasein’s self and is therefore in 
perfect accordance with Heidegger’s decisive critique of the ego as constant 
presence.  Work, however, is possible only on the basis of self-forgetting.  The 
destabilization of any present or given self and the affirmation of its perpetual 
self-surpassing, its renewal, seems to be what motivates Stiegler’s ascription of 
a highly positive valence to dissolution in work and the effects of work as such. 
What Stiegler attempts to do in making such arguments, the way I understand 
it, is nothing other than an intensification of Heidegger’s idea that Dasein’s 
authentic self-interpretation always arises out of and cannot be separated from 
its inauthentic absorption in the everydayness.  Dasein’s self-understanding is 
constituted in its return to itself from out of things or the effects of work, 
which is to say that the everyday comportment is the baseline for Dasein’s 
authentic access to itself.  However, it remains unclear how Stiegler’s analysis 
can account for any genuine change in Dasein’s self-understanding.  One 
question should suffice to show this: If,  as was said earlier, the temporality of 
the everydayness is essentially constant and undifferentiated, if this temporality 
permeates Dasein’s everyday absorption in techne, and, finally, if Dasein is 
informed by its everyday world, then where—methodologically speaking—
does the possibility of change come into the picture? The problem with 
Stiegler’s claims then seems to be his insistence on the change-inducing value 
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of techne as such, which precludes differentiation within it.  If just any instance 
whatsoever of techne offers a possibility of Dasein’s authentic return to itself, 
then the phenomenon of such a renewal remains unexplained.  Moreover, it 
appears questionable to me whether the assertion of techne in its homogeneity 
as well as an anonymous dispersion of Dasein in the world minus the notion of 
“mineness”63 (it is, after all, uncertain what exactly allows the writing person to 
identify with the writer brought into existence by writing) offer us the 
conceptual means necessary to address the transformation of experience and—
I am tempted to add—temporal unfolding as such.  In other words, if it is the 
case that the analysis of temporality as such hinges upon a rigorous notion of 
change, the fully-developed understanding of temporality and, by extension, of 
historicality, the analysis that lacks such a notion does not seem to be 
particularly vital. 
  Nevertheless, the emphasis on the outside may be appreciated in the 
early Heidegger’s own thinking of authenticity and inauthenticity.  We can see 
that this is the case by paying attention to the troubled aspects of his notion of 
the call of conscience.  It is not clear how we are to think about the 
simultaneity of Dasein’s calling itself and being called upon and in fact why we 
may want to assert the simultaneity in the first place.  In other words, 
Heidegger—his resistance to such traditional notions of the self as interiority 
or self-subsisting entity notwithstanding—does not tell us why the call has to 
have the double origin in the world and Dasein.  The suspicion that thinking 
Dasein as the partial origin of the call is haunted by the remnants of traditional 
subjectivity is fortified by Heidegger’s abandonment of the language of the call 
of conscience altogether and the shifting of his focus to the work of art in the 
1930s.  Heidegger’s discussions of art and the poetic word specifically could be 
seen as a formal explanation of how Dasein can be called upon by the world in 
such a way that it enables a genuine modification in Dasein’s self-
understanding.  That is to say, Heidegger articulates and develops the 
differentiation within techne itself to allow for the possibility of change without 
any pronounced sense of agency.  The change happens to Dasein not because 
there is some hidden interiority of Dasein that wills it, but rather because of the 
qualitative differences inherent in the effects of techne  itself and Dasein’s 
fundamental ability to be affected and informed by techne as it is woven into 
Dasein’s surrounding world.  Heidegger thus sees that the world itself has to 
address Dasein in two emphatically different ways in order to say that there is 
more than one way of living (I use the verb in the transitive sense) temporality.  
The world as ordinary techne addresses Dasein in a way that does not introduce 
it to the essential difference between the being of Dasein and that of other 
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entities.  The world that is calling Dasein from out of the extraordinary techne of 
the work of art allows Dasein to return to itself in a restorative way or, 
differently put, to convert Dasein’s circumstantial limitations into an 
acknowledged distinctiveness out of which something new is born.  In a sense, 
this is exactly where Stiegler stops in his analysis: he intensifies the notion of 
the outside qua techne, but yet he does not elaborate on any distinction within 
techne that would bring about any change in Dasein.  I therefore find the later 
Heidegger’s writings on art critically important in thinking through the issue of 
the self and the outside under the rubric of temporality without sliding into the 
language of interiority.  To return to the question I raised at the beginning of 
the essay, it seems to me that the distinction between authenticity and 
inauthenticity—however subtle—is an integral part of Heidegger’s notion of 
temporality as such.  Whether it is possible to collapse this distinction and yet 
present a viable account of change is the question that remains to be critically 
examined elsewhere. 
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